 

Syria as candidate for air attack

## Purpose

The purpose of this operation is to support Turkey and Israel in defeating the Syrian aggression. End state is that the Syrian ability to conduct offensive operations in the region is neutralized. Turkey and Israeli territorial integrity restored. International freedom of movement in the region restored.

## Scope

No speculation is included as to possible locations of forward bases. Likewise the specific strength of the required air force has not been considered.

## Guidance

IAW CJTF-82 OPORD OPAR - CJTF forces will deploy to the area of operations (AO) and restore Turkish and Israeli territorial integrity, once sufficient forces is available CJTF-82 will neutralize Syrian offensive capability in order to (IOT) contribute to a secure and stable environment, which will facilitate a lasting peace and render future international military presence unnecessary.

COM JFACC will:

1.3.1. Establish and maintain air superiority over Turkey and Israel.

1.3.2. Establish and maintain air superiority over Syria for phase 2.

1.3.3. Plan, organize and execute targeting on behalf of CJTF-82.

1.3.4. Conduct AI campaign to break the Syrian will and capability to conduct offensive operations in phase 2.

1.3.5. Support CJTF-82 with air support as requested throughout the operation.

## Maps

# Air Force Objectives

## General Principles

## Air defense

It is axiomatic that air defenses can reduce the efficiency of, but not prevent, air attack.

Syria has one of the most robust SAM networks in the Middle East. Multiple SAM sites provide redundancy ensuring overlapping coverage for critical areas.

The Syrian IADS relies heavily on strategic and tactical Soviet era systems including SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-11. Tactical SAM systems such as SA-6, SA-11, SA-8 and SA-15s are also employed at numerous fixed sites to provide defense in depth to strategic systems.

Syrian strategic SAM deployment have historically been concentrated against obvious potential threat ingress routes, as such most of the sites were placed placed adjacent to the Golan Heights and cities of Hims, Halab and Damascus.

A significant part of the Syrian strategy is the employment of mobile SAM systems to catch opposing aircraft off-guard by appearing in new, previously undocumented locations.

The Syrians understand their reliance on aging and well-known legacy SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. To address these liabilities, the Syrians are thought to be actively seeking modern air defense systems to effect the defense of its airspace and critical infrastructure.

## Ideal Aerospace objective

## CJTF objective in war with Syria

1. Deny Syrian offensive capability against neighboring countries
2. Eliminate threat from Syrian WMD programs
3. Reduce threat from terror groups and insurgency groups that gain support from Syria

## Applications of principles in this study

# Environment

## Geographical

Syria claims a territorial limit of 35 nautical miles off its Mediterranean coastline. Syria is a flat, littoral sand covered country along the Mediterranean Sea, broken only by lateral promontories running down from the mountains by the Turkish border to the sea, cut diagonally by the Euphrates river divided into thirteen provinces, centrally controlled from Damascus.

## Population

Population ca 20 million with a  mosaic of social groups of various sizes that lack a consistent stratification system linking shared values and loyalties binding the population into a nation. Larger concentrations found in the major cities of Damascus, Aleppo (the country's largest city), and Hims (Homs); more than half of the population lives in the coastal plain, the province of Halab, and the Euphrates River valley.

## National Character

## Economy

Agriculture and oil. Highly dependent on diminishing water reserves.

## Political-military foundation

Very centralized system, hierarchical

## Summary

Liberalization of economic policies underway with privatization on the rise. Increased pressure on water supplies due to heavy use. Led by a highly authoritarian, hardheaded regime under a presidential republic with a socialist Baath Party doctrine in place, mostly pragmatical in fashion. The president is at the center of power in Syria but has three vice presidents, none of which have been specifically designated as successors.

Two other branches of government include the Council of Minsters and the Peoples Council.

Syria's status as a regional power imposes costs and liabilities to the Arab world, primarily because of its maverick support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and its involvement in Lebanon.

# Fielded Military Forces

## National Military Policy

### Doctrine

Very centralized system, hierarchical

The Syrians recognize that effective command and control is critical for success in modern combined arms warfare. Their method of insuring success is to establish and to maintain a system of tightly centralized control over the combat and supporting forces at each level of command.

The Syrian commander at each level is charged with overall responsibility for his forces. Syrian doctrine emphasizes that under the fluid conditions of modern warfare, even during carefully planned operations, the commander must accomplish assigned missions on his own initiative without constant guidance from above. To do this, the commander must be well informed about the general situation and the intentions of the senior commander. The Corps commander is responsible for the conduct of the entire operation in which his Corps is involved and for carrying out long-term operational plans. Division commanders, in turn, receive their missions from their respective Corps commanders.

Neutralization of the centralized command and control structure will have the effect of paralyzing the organization. If a division HQ/ Division commander is neutralized the Divisions operations will come to a standstill, and it will take some time (1-2 days) before the command structure is re-established and a new commander is in place to work effectively.

### Influence of geographic and economic factors

Revenue from export of oil from the oil industry in Syria is very important for the Syrian economy. Attacks or threats of attacks against the oil industry will create pressure and set conditions for leverage during negotiations in final phases of a conflict.

Due to the geography with a exposed coastline to the Eastern Mediterranean (EMED) and bordering to Israel and Turkey as a enemy, and Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan as neutral countries Syria have created a strategic depth towards the Iraqi border and placed high value items, critical infrastructure and important research in the desert far away from the coast and its enemies. In addition along the coast and the borders of Israel and Turkey a heavy focus on air defense is in place.

### Perceived greatest threat

Syria’s perceived greatest threat is western airpower and ability to conduct power projection from the air. Because of this Syria have put down a significant effort in increasing its air defense structure, and this is together with the WMD program the prioritized effort in the Syrian Armed Forces. WMD are being used as a deterrent toward any attacks, and it is likely that offensive operations against Syria will create a rationale for Syrian leadership to use or threaten to use WMD.

### Other planning factors

## Defense Establishment

### Military research

#### Al Safira Military Research Center (OPARTGT081)

Syrian military research for all domains is primarily done at Al Safira Military Research Center (OPARTGT081) about 17nm SOUTHEAST of Aleppo. This research facility is both an academic centre for research, and also a center where military officers are sent to develop new doctrine and tactics for the Syrian armed forces. The research center is the central node in the Syrian military research and it leads and coordinates research at other Syrian installations. The recent years the priority has been on air defense and missile and rocket technology. A focus have also been on the development of armor and reverse engineering of Russian T90 Tanks in order to start own production line of T90 tanks. Biological warfare also a priority and focus of effort for this research center, as the center is in competition with Sarqiyha Reserach Center (OPARTGT059) which is researching on chemical weapons. Both as part of the Syrian WMD program.

#### OPARTGT059 Sarqiyha Research Center - Chemical Weapon research facility

Destroying this facility will contribute to the overall effect of reducing the Syrian capability to enhance their weapons of mass destruction deterrence by producing more lethal and dangerous chemical weapons. Destruction of the facility will force the Syrians to only use what they currently have in its stockpile of chemical weapons, and not be able to add more advanced chemical weapons into the inventory.

#### OPARTGT058 Chemical Weapon research facility

Destroying this facility will contribute to the overall effect of reducing the Syrian capability to enhance their weapons of mass destruction deterrence by producing more lethal and dangerous chemical weapons. Destruction of the facility will force the Syrians to only use what they currently have in its stockpile of chemical weapons, and not be able to add more advanced chemical weapons into the inventory

#### OPARTGT064 Rocket research facility

Research into all aspects of rockets. Destroying this facility will contribute to the overall effect of reducing the Syrian capability of delivering weapons of mass destruction by rockets. Research is currently under way on how to better use rockets as delivery of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

### Army

#### OPARTGT001 Syrian Army HQ building 1

Syrian Army HQ is located in Aleppo. The building houses sections for planning, organizing and development in the Syrian Army. If the building is destroyed, deployment or movement of Corps size units, or the 91st Republican Guard Armored Division (Syrian strategic reserve) will be delayed by 4-7 days.

If this building is destroyed, the Syrian Army ability to conduct a offensive using more than one Corps is removed, and thus a large scale invasion from a mobilized Syrian Army will not be possible.

#### OPARTGT002 Syrian Army HQ building 2

The building houses the Syrian Army High Command section responsible for mobilization of the Syrian army. If this building is destroyed, any mobilization of army reserve units is delayed by 4-7 days.

The destruction of this building will also likely cause chaos in the mobilization and deployment of forces, and may cause battalions not ending up in the right position, causing further chaos and friction, and delaying combat effectiveness of the mobilized forces even more.

### Navy

#### Syrian Navy HQ (OPARTGT100)

Syrian Navy HQ reports to the General staff in wartime and coordinates all Syrian maritime operations. This headquarter also coordinates with any other nations that are supporting Syrian maritime operations. This headquarter is responsible for ensuring safety of crucial supplies into Syria via the sea and is also responsible for any reinforcement from the sea from supporting nations.

If destroyed, the Syrian ability to coordinate maritime operations will be severely reduced, and it will create friction in receiving supplies from civilian ship traffic with the potential to slow down the steady flow of supplies from the sea by 50%. Destruction of the building will also contribute to increased friction in coordination of oil tankers offloading from Syria with Syrian oil for the export market, and thus reducing the income for the Syrian government.

### Airforce

The Syrian Air Force have two primary objectives.

1. Defend Syrian territory.

2. Project power to Syrian enemies.

The Syrian Air Force’s most important objective is to defend the Syrian territory and because of this part of the Syrian Air Force is tied into the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). All interceptor squadrons are tied directly to the Air Defense, while the Fighter Squadrons rotate in taking turns flying Defensive Counter Air (DCA) missions in various parts of Syrian to ensure a high readiness of fighter aircrafts to support against any aggression toward Syrian territory.

Syrian Air Force have a more centralized command and control than coalition air forces. This means that Syrian air operations are more scheduled and will come in waves. The Syrian forces are not trained and have a level high enough for conducting decentralized Combined Air Operations.

Syrian Air Force has a limited if not absent inter-agency coordination between the Air Force and ground forces. Ground forces have limited means to cooperate with the Air Force, and different Districts cannot operate together on high tempo operations. This is due to organization design, command structures, lack of specific training and focus for the ground forces.

#### OPARTGT103 Syrian Air Force Headquarter

The Syrian Air Force HQ primary role is to work with long term plans, training, budgeting, which has no effect on the short term. If destroyed will reduce ability to train new pilots, introduce new aircraft, weapons, and systems.

#### OPARTGT072 60th Air Division HQ

Plans and execute major Syrian air operations for the 60th Air Division ( A-A ). If destroyed, the regiments belonging to that division will not be able to participate in major air operations until a new division headquarter is operational.

#### OPARTGT073 70th Air Division HQ

Plans and execute major Syrian air operations for the 70th Air Division ( A-G ). If destroyed, the regiments belonging to that division will not be able to participate in major air operations until a new division headquarter is operational.

#### OPARTGT074 80th Air Division HQ

Plans and execute major Syrian air operations for the 80th Support Division ( Support ). If destroyed, the regiments belonging to that division will not be able to participate in major air operations until a new division headquarter is operational.

#### Syrian Air Defense Academy (OPARTGT062)

New air defense units produced at factories are sent to the Air Defense Academy for final testing and verification, and initial training and establishment of new air defense units to replace units lost in battle or reinforce active duty Syrian Air defense units. Destruction of the facility will slow reinforcement of active duty Syrian Air defense units.

## Command, Control and Communications

Due to the centralized nature of the Syrian Command and control system, the effects of destroying the Command Centers and communication links that enable command and control will likely remove the ability for the IADS network to operate efficiently, e.g. degraded IADS, reduced readiness, increased QRA reaction time and forced autonomous action by local commanders who are not at all used to making key decisions on their own.

### OPARTGT066 Syrian ADCC

This is the central node of the entire Syrian IADS. The air defense command centre coordinates all parts of the IADS and facilitates information flow to the relevant Sector Command Centers and other participants. The Air Defense Command Centre is powered by a primary power source and a backup power source. By attacking and destroying the power sources the air defense command center is unable to function. Often the Air Defense Command Centre also will have a backup command Centre that takes its function if the primary command center is destroyed. The backup command center will have its own power sources to function. The air defense command center and backup command center are fixed installations that are not moved around.

### OPARTGT104 Backup Air Defence Command Center

Backup Center for the Primary ADCC. Located IVO Jirah. Destroying the Backup SCC will ensure complete denial of the Syrian ADCC, should it be destroyed.

### OPARTGT067 SCC SOUTH

Syrian Sector Command Center South. Controls South sector of IADS. Located at Al-Dumayr airfield. Destroying SCC South will deny IADS connectivity to the South IADS Sector.

### OPARTGT068 SCC EAST

Syrian Sector Command Center East. Controls West sector of IADS. Located IVO Tabqa airfield. Destroying SCC East will deny IADS connectivity to the EAST IADS sector.

### OPARTGT069 SCC WEST

Syrian Sector Command Center West. Controls West sector of IADS. Located IVO Abu al-Duhur airfield. Destroying SCC West will deny IADS connectivity to the WEST IADS Sector.

## Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Syrian army have three surface-to-surface missile regiments (922nd, 923rd and 924th) equipped with SCUD’s. The SCUDs can be used with either a conventional warhead, or with a WMD warhead. Destruction of the SCUD regiments will eliminate the threat of WMD delivered by ballistic missiles.

### Space

NSTR

## Air

See **INTREP VID OPAR-001 - Syrian Air** Force for detailed information about the Syrian air force.

## Land

See [Syrian Army detailed overview](https://132nd-vwing.github.io/OPAR-Brief/INTELLIGENCE/Syrian_Army.html) for information about the Syrian Army. In addition to the active duty units, the Syrian Army also have a 6th Corps that are reservists and can be mobilized on order. Mobilization of a Corps will take 7 days until the force is available at the base for mobilization, staging and training, and another 7 days of training before it can be deployed to the field. If needed, the Syrian Army headquarter also have the opportunity to mobilize only parts of the Corps as they see fit for the situation.

The Syrian army have 5 major bases (homebase for 1s, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps). When the a Corps is deployed in the field, the army base can be used as a mobilization base for mobilization units.

Destruction of a army base will have two effects:

1. It will make it impossible to mobilize Syrian forces at the base.
2. Destruction on the base will also impact the moral of the Corps that uses the base. Moral will be reduces (Skill level lowered in DCS).

## Sea

### 1st Patrol Boat Squadron

Based in Latakia, with 5xFSG 1241.1 MP Molniy

### 2nd Frigate Squadron

Based in Tartus, with 3x Frigate 1135M Rezky

## Unconventional Warfare

### Alsyf Almuqadas

Alsyf Almuqadas, السيف المقدس (Holy Sword) is an international terrorist group that supports the Syrian Regime. The terrorist group is based in Syria, but have cells operating in several countries including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Alsyf Almuqadas is capable of conducting complex attacks using both Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) in combination with attackers. The group is also reported to have been trying to acquire drones. It is likely that the groups is backed by IRAN and used in as a proxy for attacks against western influence in the region.

The group is led by Mehmed Salo, and he is responsible for several attacks against western forces in the region.

### Daw Satie

Daw' Satie (Shining Light) is a Turkish insurgency group that fights for independence in a region in Turkey. The group are supporting the Syrian regime in the border areas between Syria and Turkey. The Syrian regime is also supporting this insurgent group with weapons, money and training. Daw’ Satie has its origins in Gaziantep. The group is capable of conducting regular terrorist attack, but can also conduct conventional attacks.

The group is led by Zoran Baid.

### 931st Special Forces Brigade

The Syrian regime uses it 931st Special Forces brigade for several roles. Its missions are:

* To mentor and support terrorist and insurgent groups.
* Long range reconnaissance (in other countries)
* Direct action and sabotage against important targets in other countries.

## Summary

## Armed Forces as candidate for Aerospace attack

## Armed Forces Counterair/counterspace capability

See INTREP VID OPAR-001 - Syrian Air Force and INTREP VID OPAR-002 - Syrian IADS for detailed information about Syrian armed forces counterair capability.

In addition to this, the Syrian Army’s Corps have Air Defense divisions to protect the different Syrian Army Corps. For additional information on the Air Defense in the Syrian Army see: ***INTREP VIS B-001 Generic Ground Force Structure*** and [Syrian Army Order Of Battle](https://132nd-vwing.github.io/OPAR-Brief/INTELLIGENCE/Syrian_Army.html)

# Population

## Food supply

The country's waterways are of vital importance to its agricultural development. The longest and most important river is the Euphrates, which represents more than 80 percent of Syria's water resources.

#### Hama food factory (OPARTGT107)

This factory produces food used by Syrian army. The factory produces food to the equivalent of 1 Corps per day.

Destruction of this factory will cause a shortage of food for the Syrian army, which will cause morale to lower for the Corps affected (DCS skill unit lowered).

## Clothing

## Shelter

## Public health

### Hospitals/direct health care

NO STRIKE TGTS

### Sanitation/water supply

NO STRIKE TGTS

### Public utilities

## Agriculture

## Basic Industry

## Information

## Summary

# Infrastructure

## Communications

### Syrian Intelligence Internet Agency (SIIA) (OPARTGT094)

Syria Intelligence Internet Agency (SIIA) (OPARTGT094) serves two functions for the Syrian Armed Forces. The primary purpose is to collect intelligence in cyberspace. The second purpose is to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace. It is likely that SIIA are working towards CJTF forces both for collection and for offensive operations. Assessed targets of high interest for SIIA is penetrating command and control networks for collecting intelligence and penetrating Air Defense (Patriot and ship based air defense), as well as logistics systems to hamper CJTF resupplies of critical items into the theater. If attacked, it is likely that the Syrian forces will conduct a advanced operation starting with a offensive cyber operation to take out CJTF air defense for a time window, followed by a strike from the Syrian air force.

Destruction of this target will remove the threat of offensive operations in cyberspacefrom SIIA. Removal of this target will thus ensure that the friendly air defense network will be operational (Patriot and ship based air defense), and threat of logistical errors are removed.

### Telecommunications

#### International communication center (OPARTGT035)

The international communications center (OPARTGT035) is a dual use facility. It is used by civilian Syrian media as well as international media. In addition the Syrian Armed Forces are using one part of the building to create and broadcast propaganda on behalf of the Syrian Regime. In another part of the building the Syrian Armed Forces have a backup server for their command and control communications network that controls the armed forces.

Due to the dual use and nature of this target with civilian international media, it is a sensitive target that needs approval from CJTF-82 Commander for engagement.

Destruction of this target will reduce redundancy for Syrian armed forces to command and control own forces (Also see Damascus radio tower, OPARTGT034). In addition the destruction of the building will reduce Syrian ability to broadcast propaganda and morale of armed forces will decline (skill level of certain Syrian DCS units will be reduced

### Broadcast Media

#### Damascus radio tower (OPARTGT034)

Damascus radio tower (OPARTGT034) is a dual use facility. It’s primary purpose is to serve the Syrian society with radio coverage in the Damascus area in addition to provide the Syrian government long range communications (HF) with other parts of Syria. In addition, the Syrian Armed Forces are using the facility for long range (HF) communications for the armed forces. This tower is part of the command and control network for Syrian Armed Forces. Primarily communications from the general staff to the various services and Corps commanders are sent from this installation. Destruction of the tower will reduce redundancy in Syrian Armed Forces ability to command and control own forces, and together with other efforts against the command and control network can hamper the Syrian General Staff’s ability to give new direction to its commanders. Due to the dual use and nature of this target with civilian use of the radio long range communication, it is a sensitive target that needs approval from CJTF-82 Commander for engagement.

#### Syrian Broadcasting Headquarter (OPARTGT070)

The Syrian Broadcasting Headquarter (OPARTGT070) is a dual use facility. Its primary purpose is to be the home of the Syrian broadcasting company with workspace, offices and studios for both television and radio for several Syrian channels controlled by the Syrian Broadcasting Company. The Syrian regime is controlling the company and is using some of the channels to broadcast propaganda to the civilian population and the armed forces. Due to the nature of this target as a media outlet, it is categorized as a sensitive target that needs approval from CJTF-82 Commander for engagement.

Destruction of the building will reduce Syrian ability to broadcast propaganda and morale of armed forces will decline (skill level of certain Syrian DCS units will be reduced).

### Information Flow

#### OPARTGT065 Syrian Intelligence Agency HQ

Syrian Intelligence Agency HQ building. Downtown Damascus.

This is where central analysis of all Syrian intelligence activity takes place.

Destruction of this building will remove Syrian ability to conduct targeting of mobile CJTF units (for example CJTF CVN).

#### OPARTGT088 Syrian Intelligence office

2 similar buildings. Responsible for intelligence in the north-east sector. Located 16nm NORTHEAST of Jirah.

#### OPARTGT091 Syrian Intelligence office

Responsible for intelligence in the north-west sector. Collataral building, historic site close by. 20nm SOUTHEAST from Tartus.

## Electrical Power

### OPARTGT082 Powerplant-Coal

11nm NORTHWEST of Hama.

### OPARTGT083 Power distribution

Located NORTH of Al Tabqah.

### OPARTGT084 Powerplant – Coal

IVO Homs. Supplies power to Homs and Al Assad Airport.

### OPARTGT090 Powerplant

Large powerplant and power distribution. 14nm NORTH of Homs.

Main powerplant for southern region but contributes to the entire grid. If taken out, will force any factories IVO Homs and south to 1 factory line only as available power will be reduced by half.

### OPARTGT092 Power distribution

Located in Jirah West. Collateral damage close by, Dam and waterpipe. Main power supply for Northern Region. If destroyed, will force any factories in the North region to 1 factory line only as power will be reduced by half. Main power supply to Backup SDACC and SCC East and West Sector

### OPARTGT099 Power distribution

Located west of Damascus. Main south node routing power to Mezzeh, Marj Ruhayyl AB, Khalakal.

## Roads

## Railroads

#### Homs railroad bridge (OPARTGT105)

This bridge is a key bridge for railtraffic between north and south. Destruction of the railroad bridge will cause a delay in flow of supplies between north and south in Syria.

#### Homs railroad station (OPARTG106)

This railroad station is a key junction for traffic between north and south in Syria. Destruction of the railroad station will cause delays in flow from supplies from factories north and south of the station. Destruction of the railroad station will prevent offload of vehicles intended for Syrian Air Defense Academy (OPARTGT062), or prevent onload of trained units from Syrian Air Defense Academy.

### OPARTGT120 Hama Railroad Station

Hama railroad station

## Shipping

### OPARTGT055 Syr Naval Base Latakia

Located in Latakia, home of 1st Fast Patrol Boat squadron.

### OPARTGT056 Tartus Naval Base

Located in Tartus, home of 2nd Frigate squadron.

### OPARTGT005 Jablah Navy port

Military port for receiving resupply to Bassel Al-Assad airbase.

Located 3nm southwest of Bassel Al-Assad airfield

If destroyed, slow down the supplies to reaching Bassel Al Assad airport via sea.

### OPARTGT006 SYR Navy storage

Storage for Syrian navy, key supplies to keep ships going.

Effects if taken out: partial or complete supply depletion for Syrian Naval vessels. Forced to take in supplies from other locations.

Located in the harbour at Latakia.

## Civil aviation

See INTREP VID OPAR 003 Syrian Air Force for which airfields are used by the Syrian air force, and which are civilian airfields.

## Military Aviation

### Airbases

Runway destruction is a effective way of reducing sorties from the Syrian airforce. The Syrian forces have material and personnel for runway repair teams at all their airbases so any destruction of the runway is only temporary.

* 4x 500 Ibs bombs will render the runway non-operational for 8 hours
* 4x 1000 Ibs bombs (or 8x500 Ibs bombs) will render the runway nonoperational for 2 days
* 4x 2000 Ibs bombs will render the runway non operational for 4 days
* 6x 2000 Ibs bombs will render the runway non operational for 6 days
* 8x 2000 Ibs bombs will render the runway non operational for 8 days.

Syrian forces have material and personnel for runway repair teams at all their airbases.

### Airbase ammo storage

All active military airfields have two ammo storages. One primary (5 days), and one secondary storage (2 days).

The airbases contain ammunition for 7 days with a planned 12 sorties per day. Storage on the airbase is for ammunition for a total of 84 sorties. Once a week an ammunition convoy supplies the airbase with ammunition. For one day worth of ammunition it requires 3 vehicles (1 platoon). 1 vehicle contains ammunition for 4 sorties. The weekly resupply convoy consists of 21 vehicles (7 platoons). Optionally ammunition can also be flown in using the IL-76. 3x IL-76s will resupply an airbase with necessary ammunition for 7 days. 1x IL-76 will resupply the airbase for one day.

Also see [Jet fuel](#_Petroleum,_Oil_and) for ways to reduce Syrian air sorties.

### OPARTGT036 Minhak Airbase

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT037 Aleppo International Airport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT038 Kuweires Airbase

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT039 Jirah Airbase

Hosts the 60th 601/602 SQNs (MiG29). Close to the FLOT.

### OPARTGT040 Tabqa Airbase

Hosts the 621 (MIG25), 711/712 SQNs (MIG29) 731 Sqn (SU24).

### OPARTGT041 Abu al-Duhur Airbase

Hosts the 60th 613 SQN (MiG21). Close to the FLOT

### OPARTGT042 Taftanaz Airbase

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT043 Bassel Al-Assad Int Airport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT044 Hama Military Airport

Hosts the70th 742 (MiG21) and 701/7022 SQNs (MiG23)

### OPARTGT045 Palmyra Airport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT046 An Nasiriyah Airbase

Hosts the 70th 721/722 SQNs (MiG29) and 60th 622 SQN (MiG25)

### OPARTGT047 Al-Dumary Military Airport

Hosts the 70th 741 SQN (MiG21)

### OPARTGT048 Maji Al Sultan Heliport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT049 Der Salman Heliport

Dual use. Both civilian and military traffic

### OPARTGT050 Damascus Int Airport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT051 Qabr al-Sitt Heliport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT052 Mezzeh Military Airport

Possible staging-point or alternate for Enemy Air Assets

### OPARTGT053 Marj Ruhayyil Airbase

Hosts the 60th 611/612 SQN (MiG21). Close to the FLOT

### OPARTGT054 Khalkhalah Airbase

Hosts the 60th 603 SQN (MiG29) and 70th 763 SQN (SU24). Close to the FLOT.

## Military Bases

### OPARTGT075 1st Corps Base

14nm SOUTHEAST of Aleppo, home to the Syrian 1st Corps.

### OPARTGT076 2nd Corps Base

### OPARTGT077 3rd Corps Base

### OPARTGT078 4th Corps Base

### OPARTGT079 5th Corps Base

### OPARTGT062 Syrian Air Defense Academy

Used for training of Syrian Air Defense Forces. Neutralization of the target will reduce Syrian ability to reinforce their Air Defense units. Located SOUTH of Homs.

### OPARTGT003 922nd SCUD regiment base (WMD)

Located in Aleppo. Home base for SCUD regiment.

### OPARTGT004 923rd SCUD Regiment base (WMD)

Home base for SCUD regiment. Located in Damascus (south).

### OPARTGT102 924th SCUD Regiment base

## Summary

# System Essentials

## Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

Jet fuel:

Each Air Force airbase contains fuel for 84 sorties. (7 days with 12 sorties per day). This is normally placed in primary fuel Depot (5 days) and secondary fuel Depot (2 days).

Fuel Depots supplies the Air Force base every day. The fuel depot have fuel for 420 sorties (7 days, 5 airbases 12 sorties per day).

Every week a fuel convoy from the fuel Depot transits from the Depot to the airbase to ensure the base is full up on fuel.

If primary or secondary fuel Depots are destroyed, then the airbase cannot store fuel, and will need resupply convoys each day until a fuel Depot can be constructed. Temporary fuel Depot can be constructed in 14 days, and contains fuel for 3 days.

Each fueltruck have fuel for 4 sorties, so a total of 3 vehicles (fuel platoon) needed for a full day of sorties. The weekly convoy consist of 21 fuel vehicles (7 platoons).

So a total of 3 things that can be attacked:

• Airbase (primary and secondary)

• Fuel Depot (prevent long term usage)

• Convoy (prevent supplies for a time period).

* Important oil reserves, can supply a Division for 10 days.
* Fuel reserves, can supply squadrons/wings/sectors with fuel for 6 days?
* Oil refineries, needed to produce jet fuel. Destruction may limit available sorties.

### Sources

#### OPARTGT005 Jablah Navy port

Military port for reciving resupply to Bassel Al-Assad airbase. Located 3nm southwest of Bassel Al-Assad airfield.

#### OPARTGT006 SYR Navy storage

Storage for Syrian navy, key supplies to keep ships going. Located in the harbour at Latakia.

### Storage

#### OPARTGT085 Oil Storage

Secondary storage for fuel in the southern sector.

#### OPARTGT087 Oil Storage

Secondary fuel storage for the northern sector,

#### OPARTGT089 Oil Storage

Primary storage for fuel in Syria.

Large oil storage, along coast. Can both ship and recive oil from tankers off the coast. 10nm SOUTH of Bassel Al-Assad Airfield. The fuel storage contains jet fuel for 420 days.

## Strategic Materials

## Military production

### Vehicle Factories

For vehicle factories they produce a certain amount of production lines. 1 production line means 1 vehicle every 7 days.

With a full mobilization of the Syrian society, the factories may also be able to surge their production and are able to increase the amount of production lines they are producing, increasing the amount of vehicles being produced.

#### Tartus Vehicle factory (OPARTGT 021)

The vehicle factory in Tartus is producing military vehicles. It has been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. The factory is also producing SA-15 SAMs on an export license from Russia and is thus a important contribution to Syrian Air Defense. If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently is able to sustain 2 production lines.

#### Raqqa vehicle factory (OPARTGT 022)

The vehicle factory in Tartus is producing military vehicles. It have been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. The factory is also producing SA-2 SAMs on an export licence from Russia and is thus a important contribution to Syrian Air Defence. If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain 2 production lines.

#### Aleppo vehicle factory (OPARTGT023)

The vehicle factory in Aleppo is producing both civilian and military trucks. The factory is specialized in producing trucks using for supply operations both for the military and the civilian sector. This factory is producing trucks for Syrian logistical units such as supply trucks for ammunition, food and fuel.

#### OPARTGT024 Al Dumayr Vehicle factory

Produces military trucks. Located between Al Dumayr and An Nasiriyah.

It has been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large.

If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently is able to sustain 3 production lines.

#### OPARTGT025 Tartus S Vehicle factory

Produces armored vehicles.

It has been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. The factory is producing SA-3 SAMs on an export licence from Russia and is thus an important contribution to Syrian Air Defense.

If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently can sustain 2 production lines.

#### OPARTGT026 Damascus W Vehicle factory

Produces armored vehicles.

It has been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. The factory is producing EWR on an export licence from Russia and is thus a important contribution to Syrian Air Defense. The factory can also produce various search radars used by the Syrian Air Defenses.

If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain 3 production lines.

#### OPARTGT027 Damascus N Vehicle factory

Produces armored vehicles. Located in Damacus N.

The factory is producing SA-6 and SA-11 SAMs on an export license from Russia and is thus a important contribution to Syrian Air Defense. If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain 2 production lines.

#### OPARTGT028 Homs Vehicle factory

The vehicle factory in Homs produces armored units such as Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), BTRs and BMPs. It has been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain 3 production lines.

#### OPARTGT029 Hama Vehicle factory

The vehicle factory in Hama produces armored vehicles such as BMPs and BTRs and SCUDs. It has been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large.

If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain 2 production lines.

### Aircraft and aircraft parts factories

#### OPARTGT030 Damascus Aircraft parts factory

Supplier to OPARTGT033 Hama Aircraft factory, Damascus aircraft parts factory produces MIG29 and MIG25s aircraft sections/spare parts on licence from Russia. Destroying the parts factory will have the effect that sortie rates for affected airframes will be diminished by 1/3rd each day as the Syrians would have to resort to parts cannibalization and ordering parts to keep their aircraft flying as well as stop aircraft replenishment.

Aircraft sections are sent off to Hama aircraft factory for final assembly.

#### OPARTGT031 Al Dumayr Aircraft parts factory

Supplier to Hama Aircraft factory, Al Dumayr aircraft parts factory produces MIG21 and MIG23s aircraft/spare parts on licence from Russia. Destroying the parts factory will have the effect that sortie rates for affected airframes will be diminished by 1/3rd each day as the Syrians would have to resort to parts cannibalization and ordering parts to keep their aircraft flying as well as stop aircraft replenishment.

Produces important avionics used in repairs of fighters.

Aircraft sections are sent off to Hama aircraft factory for final assembly.

#### OPARTGT032 An Nasiriyah Aircraft parts factory

Supplier to Hama Aircraft factory, An Nasiriyah Aircraft parts factory produces SU-24 / IL-76, AN-26B and YAK-46 aircraft/spare parts on licence from Russia. Destroying the parts factory will have the effect that sortie rates for affected airframes will be diminished by 1/3rd each day as the Syrians would have to resort to parts cannibalization and ordering parts to keep their aircraft flying as well as stop aircraft replenishment. Aircraft sections are sent off to Hama aircraft factory for final assembly.

#### OPARTGT033 Hama Aircraft factory

Located close to Hama airfield. Final aircraft assembly and production on license from Russia. Parts from OPARTGT030, 031 and 032 come here by Railroad. Railroad Station is also a target. Destroying the factory will stop final assembly of aircraft sections sent here.

### Munition Factories - Shells

#### OPARTGT007 Damascus NE Ammunition Factory

Produces HE Artillery shells and/or HE/AP shells for Mechanized/MBT units. Destroying this target will reduce ammunition resupply rate of armored units by 1/3rd.

#### OPARTGT008 Tartus Ammunition Factory

Produces HE Artillery shells and/or HE/AP shells for Mechanized/MBT units. Destroying this target will reduce ammunition resupply rate of armored units by 1/3rd.

#### OPARTGT009 Damascus N Ammunition Factory

Produces HE Artillery shells and/or HE/AP shells for Mechanized/MBT units. Destroying this target will reduce ammunition resupply rate of armored units by 1/3rd.

### Munition Factories - Rockets

#### OPARTGT010 Homs Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing Rockets. This includes rockets used in A-G ordinance as well as MSLR artillery rockets. Destroying these targets will delay the resupply of units using said munitions by 1/3.

#### OPARTGT011 Raqqa Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing Rockets. This includes rockets used in A-G ordinance as well as MSLR artillery rockets. Destroying these targets will delay the resupply of units using said munitions by 1/3.

#### OPARTGT012 Jirah SW Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing Rockets. This includes rockets used in A-G ordinance as well as MSLR artillery rockets. Destroying these targets will delay the resupply of units using said munitions by 1/3.

#### OPARTGT063 Rocket motor production facility

MLRS and SCUD rocket engines. Repair and construction of rocket engines. South East of Damascus.

Colocated with target 64 and 58.

### Munition Factories - Missiles

#### OPARTGT013 Damascus NE2 Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing Surface to Air missiles for SA2, SA3, SA6 and SA11 on licence from Russia. Destroying this factory will delay resupply of those units until the facility can be repaired or the production line offloaded to another facility / production line.

#### OPARTGT014 Damascus NW Ammunition Factory

The factory produces missiles used by MIG 21, MIG23, MIG25 and MIG29 on licence from Russia. Destroying this factory will delay resupply of those units until the facility can be repaired or the production line offloaded to another facility / production line.

#### OPARTGT015 Mezzeh Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing Surface to Air missiles for SA15 as well as SA8 and SA19 on licence from Russia. Destroying this factory will delay resupply of those units until the facility can be repaired or the production line offloaded to another facility / production line.

### Munition Factories - Bombs

#### OPARTGT016 Homs SW Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing unguided bombs used in air to ground ordinance delivery. Destroying these factories will delay or deny the resupply unguided bomb units by half to front line fighter/bombers.

#### OPARTGT017 Jirah S Ammunition Factory

Known to be producing unguided bombs used in air to ground ordinance delivery. Also finaly assembly of precision guided munitions. Destroying this factory will delay or deny the resupply unguided bomb units by half to front line fighter/bombers as well as stop the production of precision guided munitions.

### Munition Factories - Ammunition

#### OPARTGT018 Hama Ammunition Factory

This facility is known to be the sole producer of munitions for front line troops as well has heavier caliber shells. The largest munition factory in Syria. Destroying this facility will delay or deny the resupply of small arms fire units as well as AAA units.

### Storage

#### OPARTGT080 Ammunition storage

Located 10nm WEST of Marj Ruhayil Airbase

#### OPARTGT098 Ammunition storage

North of Al Dumayr airfield. Grid is centregrid. Total of 7 storages (not bunkers). A-A missiles are stored here.

## WMD

### Storage

#### OPARTGT057 Chemical Weapon storage (WMD)

One of two sites that store chemical weapons produced in Jirah Chemical Weapons production facility. Destroying this target will reduce the chemical weapons inventory by 50%.

#### OPARTGT061 Chemical Weapon Storage (WMD)

#### OPARTGT020 Aleppo SCUD Storage site (WMD)

Syrian Armed Forces are secretly storing SCUDs at a civilian storage area in Aleppo. It is likely that these SCUD’s are placed in storage covertly in an attempt to avoid them being targeted. It is likely that these SCUDs are connected to the Syrian weapon of mass destruction program and can be used for delivery of chemical weapons.

Covert storage in a civilian storage area connected to rail station. Located in Aleppo.

#### OPARTGT019 Al-Dumayr SCUD storage site (WMD)

The second storage for SCUDs associated with the weapon of mass destruction program is the Al-Dumayr SCUD storage site with its hardened bunkers. It is likely that Syrian Armed Forces are storing SCUDs in these hardened bunkers in order to keep them safe from air attacks from coalition forces. It is likely that vehicles will not be taken out from the facility before they are planned to be used.

#### OPARTGT057 Chemical Weapon storage (WMD)

North al Al Dumayr airfield. 3 bunkers.

Effects of taking it out will deny the use of chemical weapons stored here.

### Chemical - Production facilities, research facilities

#### OPARTGT058 Chemical Weapon research facility

Contribute to the overall effect of reducing the Syrian capability to wage war

cause the Syrians to only use what they have, and not be able to add more stuff into the inventory.

#### OPARTGT060 Jirah Chemical Weapon production facility

#### OPARTGT059 Sarqiyha Reserach Center - Chemical Weapon research facility

### Nuclear – facility being built, research facility

### Biological – Research facility

#### Al Safira Military Research Center (OPARTGT081) (WMD)

Syrian military research for all domains is primarily done at Al Safira Military Research Center (OPARTGT081) about 17nm SOUTHEAST of Aleppo. This research facility is both an academic centre for research, and a center where military officers are sent to develop new doctrine and tactics for the Syrian armed forces. The research center is the central node in the Syrian military research, and it leads and coordinates research at other Syrian installations. The recent years the priority has been on air defense and missile and rocket technology. A focus has also been on the development of armor and reverse engineering of Russian T90 Tanks to start own production line of T90 tanks.

Biological warfare also a priority and focus of effort for this research center, as the center is in competition with Sarqiyha Reserach Center (OPARTGT059) which is researching on chemical weapons. Both as part of the Syrian WMD program.

## Summary

# Leadership

## Key people/institutions

* General XX Head of Air Force
* General XX Head of Air Defence Forces (IADS)
* General XX Head of Army
* General XX Head of Navy
* General XX Head of Intelligence service

### The Syrian National Military Command Authority

The Syrian National Military Command Authority exercises complete control over the military-economic planning and activities of Syria. It is composed of three major bodies:

• The Council of Defense.

• The Main Military Council.

• The General Staff.

#### The Council of Defense / State Committee of Defense (War cabinet)

The Council of Defense is responsible for planning and preparing the country for war. It is chaired by the General Secretary of the National Party of Syria. The council is made up of selected National party members, including the Minister of Defense. This council is Syria’s highest military-economic planning agency; it deliberates interrelated issues concerning the nation's defenses, economic plans, and government branches. These include the mobilization of industry, transportation, and manpower for war, and the peacetime structure of the armed forces. Its deliberation and decrees are translated into law. In wartime, this body would be reorganized into the State Committee of Defense -essentially a war cabinet with oversight of the political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of the nation at war, as well as general policy matters concerned with the conduct of military operations.

#### The Main Military Council / Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

The Main Military Council is immediately responsible to the Council of Defense for the overall leadership and status of the Syrian armed forces in peacetime. The Minister of Defense heads this council. The Chairman of the Council of Defense is a member, as are the First Deputy Ministers of Defense. The ministers include the Chief of the General Staff .Other members include the commanders of the five military services (Army, Navy, Airforce, Air Defence Forces, Special Forces), the Chief of the Main Political Administration, the Chief of the Rear Services, and the Chief of Civil Defense

In wartime, the council is transferred into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which represent the top echelon of Syrian wartime military-control. The General Secretary of the National Party, as Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, becomes the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Syrian Armed Forces. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command plans and direct strategic operations on a large scale through different theaters of military operations, sizing and allocating forces to implement its plans. The number of fronts, their composition, missions, and the general plans for the conduct of strategic operations will be established by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It also will monitor individual front and fleet actions and supervise coordination between them.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command is located in building of the Syrian Ministry of Defence (OPARTGT095)

#### The General Staff

The General Staff is the major link in the centralization of the Syrian National Military Command Authority. The General Staff is the executive agency for the Main Military Council in peacetime and The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in wartime. The Syrian General Staff is charged with the basic military planning for the Syrian Armed Forces, both in peace and war. The military services, the military districts, and the Groups of Forces outside Syria report to the Minister of Defense through the General Staff in peacetime. In wartime, field forces) reports to the Supreme Commander in Chief and the headquarters of the supreme high command through the General Staff.

#### OPARTGT095 Syrian Ministry of Defense

#### OPARTGT096 Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

#### OPARTGT097 Syrian Ministry of Finance

#### OPARTGT086 Syrian Armed Forces Commander residence

Located in Damascus

## Control Systems

## Opposition

## Communications

## Strategic capabilities/assets

### SCUD

#### OPARTGT003 922nd SCUD regiment base

#### OPARTGT004 923rd SCUD Regiment base

#### OPARTGT102 924th SCUD Regiment base

### WMD

### Special Forces

#### OPARTGT071 931st Special Forces Brigade

## External politics /alliances

Russia: Close connection

Iran: Close connection

China: Opposed to CJTF and the allies. Supporting Syria

Egypt: Supporting Russia

Pakistan: Syria delivers technology to Pakistan and receive jets and military support.

Jordan /Lebanon (neutral)

France

## Summary